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'While the subject of this thesis is pointed toward
the decision of President Truman's January 5t 1950 De-
claration not to defend Formosa in the interests of the
Chinese Nationalists, certain other facets cannot be
overlooked. They are important substantive accessories
to that declaration. The primary specific point is the
United States attitude toward China before the Declara-
tion. Other points are the United States 1 attempts at
Isolationism immediately after world War II, the im-
portance of Formosa in the island chain of defenses of
national interest to the United States, the internation-
al legal status of Formosa, the predominant attitudes of
Formosans, and the United States* position at the time
we chose not to defend. Also of interest are the re-
sults of public opinion polls taken during the period
concerned.
References to the Korean War are avoided, al-
though it is recognized that the war precipitated a
change in policy to isolate Formosa and thus take a firm
stand in the Far East against Communism. It is recog-
nized that President Truman's decision to use the
Seventh Fleet in the Straits of Formosa to defend that
island and to discourage Nationalist Forces from creating
a second front was an extremely unimportant one, but it
was forced by the Korean War. Had the war not occurred,
there is a possibility that the President never would

have made that decision. One will never know what other
events would have been changed had certain already his-
toric events had never happened or had occurred at a dif-
ferent time under different circumstances.

Prelude
To .provide a better perspective on American policy
toward Formosa during 1950 » the collapse of the National-
ist Government on mainland. China and its'- retreat to the
island of Formosa should be understood. This background
should include, briefly, American orientation in world
politics during and immediately after World War II do-
mestic policies and the development of United States
policy toward China during the period after World War II,
with particular emphasis on developments in 19^9 &nd
early 1950 before the outbreak of the Korean War.
The aftermath of World War II inherited much of
the successes, failures and unfinished business of the
war. So much was expected and disillusionment had seldom
been so great. The tendency of the United States to re-
act with less urgency toward new shifts and alignments in
world politics, was compounded by belief in a set of as-
sumptions which were no longer valid once the Axis powers
had been defeated. The basic assumption was that in
their own interests, members of the Grand Alliance would
collaborate to reach a peace settlement in Europe and
Asia and to solve world problems through the United
Nations. The anticipated period of peace captured the
imagination of many statesmen but at the same time, pro-
Ruhl J. Bartlett, The Record of American Diplo-
macy
,





vided an opportunity for many others to take advantage of
the first few years of peace to advance their interests
that had been interrupted by the war. The rise of Rus-
sian sattelite movements and of Chinese Communism was
apparent even before the victorious powers met at Potsdam.
By then, the ambitions of the Chinese communists were al-
ready clear but many Americans, including Fresident Tru-
man, Secretary of State James Byrnes and others, despite
2
warnings by Averell Harriraan and General John R. Dean,
were inclined to practice their diplomacy with faith,
honesty and fairness and were reluctant to believe the
true nature of- the Communist expansion and its implica-
tions for immediate and future United States security.
As Herbert Feis stated:
This trend of mind and diplomacy during
so critical a period was in one aspect an
avoidance of the realities of difference
with communism. In another, it was a
search for a way to subvert these reali-
ties. \fhen theory tyranizes over facts,
grief is apt to follow, but when facts of
the moment tyrannize over theory, the
chance of improvement is lost.o
Most American policy makers were traditionally oriented
to the role of passive observers of the world scene and
rarely that of active partners. They were not globally
2Herbert Fies, Between War and Peace , The Potsdam





oriented and national interests were oriented toward do-
mestic problems. To the Americans, victory over the
Axis Fowers would automatically foster the end of power
conflicts, "...the end of America* s time of troubles."
Victory in World War II wished to revert to Isolationism
and other compatriots sensed that security required that
they participate actively in world affairs. Failure of
the Grand Alliance concept and public confusion were in-
evitable during the 19^-5-50 transition period when ideal
expectations were out of harmony with the demanding pre-
clseness of national politics and the equally demanding
preciseness of international politics. During this tran-
sition period, the China problem became a predominant
topic of interest.
China Folicy
United States policy toward China during World
War II anticipated that China would 'fill the power vacuum
that would exist as a result of the total Japanese defeat.
This anticipation was based on the fact that rival
Chinese groups could be unified through some arrangements
that would make China strong, united and democratic.
Churchill, Eden and Stalin regarded this policy with
skepticism.-* In any case, the exigencies of prosecuting
^Robert Endicott Osgood, Ideals and Self-interest
in America* s Fore ign Relations (Chicago, University of
Chicago Press, I953T, p. ^32.
^Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins , an In-
timate History
,




the war prevented the Allies from contriving any specific
formula for post-war China. The United States policy re-
mained strictly that of keeping China in the war on the
Allied side and therefore organizing the combined strength
6
of the various Chinese forces to achieve that end.
While this was the existing policy, the principle
objective to which United States policy was unreservedly
committed was that all the Chinese political and ideolo-
gical differences could be worked out in some form of a
coalition government, by being "strong, united and demo-
7
cratic. To reach this objective, the United States
sent two successive but unsuccessful representatives to
China, Ambassador Patrick Hurley and General George C.
Marshall. General Marshall, in an attempt to mediate the
differences between the Nationalists and Communists, stay-
o
ed in China for one year, but his mission was a failure.
On January 6, 19^7 * President Truman terminated
the mission and announced the recall of General Marshall.
The General left China soon thereafter and withdrew the
o
remainder of the American forces. Marshall's mission
"U.S. Department of State, United States Relations
with China
, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
W+9), p. iv.
'See text of this policy in December, 19^5 » ibid .
,
pp. 607-609.
8U.S. Relations with China , Chapter V.
o





represented the last real attempt of the United States at
bringing a solution to China* s problems.
While the year of 19^7 witnessed a turning point in
the United States policy toward Europe as evidenced in
the Truman Doctrine and the subsequent Marshall Plan,
the aforementioned doctrine was not considered practical
to China because both Marshall and Acheson felt that
massive intervention would have been required to rescue
her from Communist control. The decision not to apply
to the Truman Doctrine to China raised questions concern-




the China problem. Certain experts on rar East rn Af-
fairs were even charged as being pro -communists.
After the. failure of Marshall's efforts in China,
there appeared to be five choices left open to the admin-
istration: to pull out, as Dean Acheson stated, "Lock
stock and barrel"; to cooperate further with the Kuo
min tang and try to prevent their downfall through massive
Francis 0. Wilcox and Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, He-
cent American Foreign Policy , Basic Documents 19^1-1951«
Joseph M. Jones, The Fif'teen Week s (February 21-
June $., 19^7 ), (New York: The Viking Press,' 1955), P- 196*.
12H.B. iesterfield , Foreign Policy and Party Poli-
tics
,
Pe?rl Harbor to Korea, (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2nd Ed., (1958), p. 256.
-^Ross Y. Koen, The China Lobby in American Poli-
tics
,
(New York, The MaoMIllan Company, I960), pp. 195-223




aid; "to allow existing programs of aid to continue to
their termination, then to dissociate from the collapse
of the nationalists; to court the Chinese Communists so
as to prevent then from becoming too dependent on the
Soviet Union,
By 19^9, State Department officials considered
the position of the Nationalists as hopeless. In Novem-
ber, 19^8, in a paper to the administration, they re-
commended that the American public should be given an
explanation as to the "inadequacies of the Chiang Kai-
shek government." This paper stated further that there
were two alternatives for the United States: "(1) to
follow this course ^go to the American public/, or (2) to
continue to do all we can to support Chiang and accept the
embarrassments that will accompany the disintegration of
China. -5 Truman and Karshall rejected the first alterna-
tive' because they feared that public opinion was against
Chiang and thus would be instrumental in administering
the final blow to the Nationalist government. Their fears
were not completely unfounded because a December, 19^-9
public opinion poll indicated that a slight majority of
people familiar with the war opposed massive aid to the
Nationalist government, in spite of the majority opinion
that the China war was a real threat to world peace and
Walter Hi His, The Forrestal Diaries
,
(New York
The Viking Press, 1951), p. 53$.

the Chinese communists took their orders from Moscow.
7.
16
However, a pcli taken about seven months earlier indicated
17
public approval of significant aid to Chiang Kai-shek.
While the administration rejected the State Depart-
ment's first alternative, they also were unwilling to ac-
cept the seccr-i. Instead, the United States drifted
rapidly to ar.:' through a watch-and-wait attitude toward
Communist China and a disengagement from economic and
military aid to the Nationalist Chinese. While it was
not desireable to openly court Chinese Communism, neither
was it desireable to jeopardize any possible future rela-
tions.
By the summer of 19^9, the United States still did
not have any positive policy toward China, but there was
Asked of 79$ of a national sample who had heard
or read of the war:
"Do you think the fighting in China is Yes k5%
a real threat to world peace or not?" No 12$
No Opinion 12$
"Do you thin!-: the Chinese Communist Yes 51%
take their orders from Moscow or ' No 10}o
Not?" No Opinion 18$
"Would you favor or oppose sending FAUDH 28$
Chiang Kai shek's Nationalist Qualified Favor h%
government about 5 Billion dol- Oppose 34$
lars worth of goods and military No Opinion 13$
supplies in the next year to try
to keep China from going Commun-
ist?"





8a declaration of future intentions in a statement by
Secretary of State Acheson. In regards to aid to foreign-
nations, Including China, he said, "while the United States
can with the best of intentions contribute substantial
aid to a foreign government, it cannot guarantee that
that aid will achieve its purpose. The achievement of
that purpose must, in the final analysis depend upon the
degree to which the recipient government and people make
wise use of our assistance and take effective measures
-I o
for self help." He made it clear that the communist
regime was x-jinning over a large number of supporters in
spite of being- guided by an imperialist regime while the
Chinese Nationalists were losing dispite extensive United
States assistance and advice. But he remained convinced
that our "traditional" policy toward the Far East remained
valid. This policy was based on the following principles:
1. The U.S. desires to encourage in every
way the development of China as an inde-
pendent and stable nation able to play
a role in world affairs suitable for a
great and free people.
2. The U.S. desires to support the creation
in China of economic and political con-
ditions which will safeguard basic
liberties and progressively develop the
economic and social well being of its
people.
3« The U.S. is opposed to the subjugation
of China to any foreign power, to any
regime acting in the interest of a
1 Department of State Bulletin
, Vol. 21, No. 528,




foreign power, and to the dismemberment
of China by any foreign power, whether
by open or clandestine means.
4» The U.S. will continue to consult with
other Interested powers, in the light
of conditions in the countries con-
cerned and in the Far 2ast as a whole,
on measures which will contribute to
the continuing security and welfare of
the peoples of that area.
5. The United States will encourage and
support efforts of the United Nations
to achieve these objectives and parti-
cularly to maintain peace and security
in the Far East.-^n
While the principles of policy as stated were no
different from previous principles, the preceding portions
of the statement and certain events which occurred earlier
should have been a clear indication to the Nationalists
that further aid was in jeopardy. And indeed it was, be-
cause prior to /icheson's statement, the administration had
already made significant cuts in aid to the Nationalists
.
In February, 19^9 » the administration decided to stop a
shipment of £60 million worth of military supplies of an
additional $125 million aid fund previously granted under
20
the Eightieth Congress. Secretary Acheson also reject-
ed a proposal of fifty senators introduced in March in a
bill providing up to $1,500 million in credits for economic
and military aid to the Nationalist government on the con-
19Ibid.
20





dltion that they accept American direction and supervision
of its armed forces and pledge tax revenue of its major
21ports as collateral for the loan. Acheson did make a
counter-proposal for aid to those areas-- outside Communist
control amounting to $5^" million to be financed by the
unexpected funds remaining ECA appropriation, due to ex-
pire on April 1, 19^9 • On June 3°» the administration
announced the withdrawal of all remaining American troops
from China. Finally, the State Department issued the
publication then known as the White Paper early in August
defending the administration and attributing failure of
United States policy in China to maladministration of
Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government.
Recognition of Communist China
The rapid disintegration of the Nationalist forces
on the mainland of China brought up the problem of possibly
recognizing the obviously forthcoming Communist government
»
The official United States position was indicated in mid-
19^9.
Our view was that no benefit would be de-
rived by any hasty Individual act, that
...we thought this was a problem of suf-
ficient complexity and seriousness that it
should be approached with great caution




(New York: Harper Brothers, 1950j, p. 28*5.

11.
and no sense of haste, 22
In October 19^9. secretary ncheson announced the
criteria for recognition of a new government. The criter-
ia were that it had to: control the country it claimed
to control; recognize its international obligations; and
rule with the acquiescence of the people. Actually, the
criteria were not any different than the principles he
had stated two months earlier. However, the Communists
had already clearly indicated that they had no intention
of cooperating with the United States and had blasted the
23United States with its propaganda. -' Five United States
Information Services in Shanghai, Hankow, Feiping, Tient-
sin and Nanking were closed by the Chinese in July.
George V. Allen, Assistant Secretary of State for Public
Affairs declared that rtThis is a new and dramatic proof
that Communist dictatorships .. .strike out the free flow
2k
of information immediately upon seizing power." More-
over, the Chinese Communists refused to grant exit visas
to many American military attaches and other personnel
which resulted in a strong demand for remedial action
22Department of State, Transcript of Proceedings,
"Conference on problems of United States policy in China,"
p. 21.
-^Report of John Cabot (Shanghai), Department of
State Bulletin, Vol. XX, Eo «, 502, February 13, 19*1-9.
2k
Ibid ., August 1, 1949, p. 153.

12
from the Secretary of State. The Communists ignored the
United States 1 note and continued their harassment of
Americans. The most publicized incident was the treatment
of Angus Ward, United States Consul General at Mukden,
whom the Communist had detained from late 19^8 to November
2 *?19^9 • Ward was finally released after repeated demands
were ignored for one year, but his release did not set a
precedence for the Communists in regards to other Ameri-
cans who had been arbitrarily detained. The severe treat-
ment of Americans and severe anti-American propaganda
virtually shut off all possible roads toward a better
understanding between the United States and the Chinese
Communist regime. Under the circumstances, it made it
difficult for the United States to grant immediate recog-
nition of Red China. After the Peoples' Republic of China
announced the inauguration on October 1, 19^9* recogni-
tion was granted the next day by the Soviet Union and by
Great Britain the following month. Several other coun-
tries granted recognition during the next few months, but
the United States decided not to go along with them.
Public opinion, as indicated by a poll in November,
25
see details of the Ward Incident in Department
of State Bulletin , November 28, 19^9, pp. 799-800.

13.
19^9 "was generally opposed to recognition. ° By the end
of the year, many members of congress were concerned that
the United States was on the verge of recognizing the Red
Chinese government. '
The Dilemma
In general, the administration's stand on the re-
cognition by the end of 19^9 was one of waiting "until
?8
the dust settled." While the Chinese Communists' ac-
tions gave no Indication that they were desirous of
United States recognition, the United States remained
patient. This act of non-recognition was not a policy of
the United States, but instead was a reaction to an un-
friendly attitude of the Chinese Communists toward the
United States.
Historically, Formosa has always played the role
of a key strategic position in the 'western Pacific. Im-
mediately after the war, Formosa was linked with American
_z
76% of a national sample
who had heard or read about
the war in China were asked,
MDo you think the U.S.
should recognize the new Favor Recog 20;"o
government in China, being set Opposed k2?o
up by the Communist Party— . No Opinion lk%
that is do you think we should
send an ambassador and have
dealing with this government
in China?
27Mew York Times , January 1, 1950.
?R






security in the Pacific, and its strategic importance was
.officially recognized by the State Department.
Strategic factors greatly influence the
problem of Formosa. With the '"exception
of Singapore no location in the Far East
occupies such a controlling position. 29
Since the end of the war until January, 1950, the
Americen policy was to maintain Formosa in friendly hands,
However, the spread of the civil war through retreat of
Chiang to Formosa raised questions whether or not to keep
that island in friendly hands or to defend it became a
subject of great debate.
Those who recognized the historic and contemporary
strategic value of Formosa felt that its defense was &n
absolute necessity. Generally, these same officials also
argued against the recognition of Red China. Many con-
gressional les.ders dwelt upon the strategic importance of
China, particularly Senators Knowland and Smith. Both
had made separate extensive trips to the Far East to de-
termine if the opinions they had already formed were sub-
stantiated by facts.
Senator Smith, in personal correspondence with
Secretary Acheson urged that under no conditions should
the United States recognize the Chinese Communist govern-
ment at that time ^December, 19^2/ ?-nd "under no condi-
tions should we let Formosa fall into the hands of the
p. 1019
"^Department of State Bulletin, June 3, 19^4-5,

15.
Chinese Communists or under the domination of Russia.™
.He further justified, the defense of Formosa because its
loss to hostile hands would "definitely threaten our se-
curity." In another letter to the Secretary of State
about a month later, Smith contended that the loss of
Formosa would seriously "threaten our defense line... from
31Japan /to/--the Philippines."-^
General MacArthur, then Supreme Allied Commander
Pacific, stressed in his newspaper interviews the need to
build up a strong defensive perimeter— sometimes known
as the "MacArthur line "--along the islands of the western
Pacific. In naming the islands that should be included
In the perimeter, MacArthur did not originally mention
32Formosa,-' However, Formosa must have been on his mind
since he later stated:
My views on Formosa are pretty well known,
I believe if you lose Formosa, you lose
the key to our littoral line of defense
and encompass TRUK. I believe the Philip-
pines and Japan would both be untenable
from our military point of view Formosa
cannot be taken by Red China as long as
the United States maintains control of
the sea and air. There is not the capa-
city, in my opinion to storm the gates
3°i-]llitary Situation in the Far East, p. 3315.
Also Congressional Record , Senate, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess,
Vol. 96 , Part I , January 9, 1950, pp. 150-151.
31Ibid., pp. 15^-155; Military Situation in the
Far East, pp. 3316-331?.
32
The New York Times, March 2, 19^9, p. 22 <,

16.
of Formosa.... I "believe that from our
standpoint, we practically lose the Paci-
fic Ocean if we give up or lose Formosa.
I don't want you to misunderstand me,
We haven't the faintest agressive intent
against Formosa. We do not need Formosa
for our bases or anything else. But
Formosa should not be allowed to fall
into Red hands,^
Thus, the proponents of the defense of Formosa generally
felt that the island, being the only insular area without
American bases from Sakhalin to Borneo was significant
on the strategic map of the western Pacific. As one
writer put it--
As long as Formosa is under the control
of a friendly government the island can
give no real concern to the United States,
but if it fell into the hands of a hos-
tile regime American interests in the
Western Pacific could be jeopardized.
^
The question of Formosa naturally became a subject of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff who at that time were General
Dwlght D. Eisenhower, General Omar Bradley, General Al-
fred Gruenther and Admiral L.A. Denfield. In a meeting
with Secretary of Defense Johnson, the question was
raised as to what the enemy could do in possession of
Formosa,^
33
* "'Military Situation in the Far East
, pp. 52-53
34Current History
, Vol. 13, January, 19^9 "Strate-
gic Formosa," Russell H. Fifield, p. 220.




After lengthy discussions, no concensus of opinion
could be obtained among the Joint Chiefs.--' This is not
to say that the Joint Chiefs did not recognize the strate-
gic importance of Formosa.' They were always in favor of
keeping that island in friendly hands, but were reluc-
tant to defend it by military means. They reaffirmed this
view in August, 19^9* and expressed concern over the po-
litical effect of the fall of Formosa on other areas with
37the U.S. defense perimeter. ' A proposal for sending a
United States military mission to Formosa was transmitted
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in September, but they re-
jected it and maintained their rejection until December,
19^9-3 By that time, they realized that the amphibious
strength of the 'Communist Chinese navy was not formidable
enough to mount a successful amphibious attack on the
300,000 troops on Formosa, The Joint Chiefs therefore
changed their position and recommended a modest aid pro-
gram to the Nationalists on Formosa. *"
The State Department had no new positive policy
toward Formosa as a result of changing conditions. Secre-
tary Acheson would employ diplomatic and economic means
36Ibid ., p. 2577.
37Ibid ., p. 2371o




to keep Formosa out of hostile control, but would not
fight for it by military means. As described by Secretary
Acheson, the policy of the United States toward Formosa
from October, 19^8 to June 25 1 1950 was as follows:
...It was understood and agreed that For-
mosa had strategic importance so far as
the United States was concerned.
...that /the/ strategic importance relat-
ed to keeping Formosa out of the hands of
a poller which would be hostile to the Unit-
ed States, and did not concern occupying or
using Formosa by the United States.
...In the existing condition and strength
of the Armed Forces of the United States,
it was not possible to commit or promise
to commit any forces whatever .> .to the de-
fense of Formosa
o
...The State Department should, to the best
of its ability, by diplomatic and economic
means try to keep Formosa from falling in-
to hands which were hostile to us.^q
This was not a new policy but a continuation of
that policy previously mentioned which had been applied
on the mainland.
• Thus, differences of opinion concerning Formosa be-
tween the State Department, Congress and the Defense De-
partment and the Joint Chiefs of Staff persisted. The
differences were caused primarily by different evalua-
tions of political and military power of the Nationalists
on Formosa. In general, the State Department's policy






regarding Nationalist China, and that the fall of Formosa
.was inevitable, Congress* s positicn was that the fall of
Formosa would mean the complete downfall of the national-
ist regime and that every effort should 'be made to save
it. The military's position was that the fall of Formosa
was not inevitable with only modest American aid. All
parties, however, did agree on its strategic importance.
In December, the Secretary of Defense had insisted
that Formosa should not be allowed to fall, and a new
proposal, based on a re-study by the Joint Chiefs, was
submitted to the Fresident prior to his departure to Key
West. Secretary riches on accompanied the President. The
new proposal recommended a military mission to Formosa
and an amendment" to theChina Aid Act of 1948 recommending
additional funds, but the State Department did not concur
41
with the proposal. On December 22, President Truman
met with Johnson and indicated that while he did not dis-
agree with the military considerations of the Department
of Defense on the strategic importance of Formosa, but
there x\rere also "political problems" involved which should
be discussed with the State Department. Clearly, the
State Department had convinced the President that their
policy regarding Formosa was the- correct policy.
On December 23 » 1949 the Secretary of State issued
^Ibid






a secret policy information paper to the Voice of America
and other United States information offices. ^ Basically,
its purpose was to Instruct United States information of-
ficers in giving a counter-argument to those who demanded
American defense of Formosa. They were Instructed to
play down the misconceived idea of the strategic value of
Formosa, to indicate that its fall vrould by no means
threaten the security of the United States, to disclaim
that this country had any intention whatever of interven-
ing militarily to save Formosa, and to emphasize the fact
that the collapse of the Nationalist regime vrould be
nothing beyond' normal expectation.
The contents of the Policy Information leaked from
an unknown source to the press. On January 3i 1950 a
United Press dispatch from Tokyo approximated the content
of that instruction, and it was alleged that the leak
occurred in General I-IacArthur* s headquarters. At a
later date, Secretary Acheson admitted that he was fully
responsible for the dispatch of this instruction since it
was issued by the Public Affairs Division of the State De-
partment with the approval of Secretary of State. It was
intended to instruct information officers as to .the content
of their broadcast material in order to mitigate the
U.S. Separtment of State, Public Affairs Area
—
Policy Advisory Staff (Special Guidance No, 28, December
23 t 19^9) Policy Information Paper—Formosa.
L1I4. .




.psychological i-npact of the Fall of Formosa to the Commun-
ists. Acheson felt that the guidance was general in
character and did not reflect in any fixed policy of the
administration. The Committee on Armed Services and the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate did not hold
this view. In their opinion, the Policy Information
paper was "an actual statement of policy on the part of
the United States Department of State in which we announced
to our foreign representatives that Formosa was not of
strategic importance to the United States and that its
control by the Communist forces would not imperil our
position in the Far East... no matter how the directive is
explained, it reflects little credit to the honor and dig-
nity of the United States."^" In spite of Secretary Ache-
son's attempt to play down the importance of the Folicy
Information paper, the paper was consonant with a policy
that had already been decided on. Essentially, "...there
were two studies made, in September and October as to the
imminence and danger. . .that the fall would occur .. .probAb-
ly in the year 1950." In addition, General Uedemeyer,
representing the Army General Staff, recommended to the
Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, on August
26, 19^9 to "...consider information measures designed






to. . .minimize the 111 effects on the governments and
peoples of western-oriented nations and particularly those
of the rar East," should Formosa be lost. Whether
Wedemeyer's memorandum reflected the view of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff or just that of the Army is not known.
On January 1, 1950 » the New York Times reported
that on December 29 * the National Security Council had
made the decision that no military mission would be sent
to Formosa. It was also reported that the Council had
recommended to the President that no military action by
the United States in defense of Formosa was strategically
important, "...but not important enough to risk the crea-
tion of another 'Spanish situation* in which the Soviet
Union might back the Chinese Communists in an assault on
Formosa and the United States might mastermind the de-
fense," and that. American occupation of Formosa was not
Justified. 9 - -
The NSC decision disturbed the Republican leaders
of the Senate. Senator Knowland was urged by ex-President
Hoover to give naval protection to Formosa and on the same
day, Sinator Robert Taft, in a press conference, called
Memorandum of Lieutenant General Albert Wedemeyer,
General Staff Corps, for George V. Allen, Assistant Secre-
tary of State for Public Affairs, August 26, 19^9, subject:




The New York Times , January 1, 1950.
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for defense of Formosa in the event of attack.
The White Fa per
By December, as mentioned previously, the majori-
ty of the American people who were aware of the war and
believed that it was inspired by the Soviet Union and
posed a threat to world peace, still felt that no massive
aid should be provided Chiang. This shift in public at-
titude from an earlier survey could well have been caused
by the publication of The China "White Faper on July 30,
19^9.
51
As Secretary Acheson stated in his Letter of
Transmittal of the document
—
This is a frank record of an extremely
complicated and most unhappy period in
the life of a great country to which the
United States has long been attached by
ties of closest friendship. No avail-
able item has been omitted because it
contains statements critical of our pol-
icy or might be the basis of future criti-
cism,, The inherent strength of our sys-
tem is the respon siveness of the govern-
ment to an informed and critical public
opinion , ,-p
In spite of the administration's interest in the
-5°The New York Time s, January 3, 1950.
5lQriginally issued as United States Relation:
with China with special reference to the period 1944-
19^9. Department of State Publication 3573, Far Eastern
Series 30.
52
The China White Paper
, p. III. "Italics Nine*

24.
responsiveness of public opinion, Tyman P. Van Slyke, in
his introduction to The China Uh ite Paper , felt that it
"was issued to counter largely Republican criticism."
Van Slyke also stated that President Truman believed his
two goals of the White Paper—objectivity and justifica-
tion—were compatible. As it turned out, his—and Ache-
son* s--critlcs found the ./hi te Paper neither objective
nor convincing.
Congressional criticism was not isolated to the
Republican party but crossed party lines. One democrat,
Senator ricCarran of Nevada predicted that Acheson's poli-
cy would bring'"all Asia under communist control "in a
54
short time." Another democrat, Representative Cox of
Georgia called the White Paper a "face saving device" and
an "alibi o"-5 Senator Martin stated that the White Pap e
r
amounted to an "oriental Munich" which even its propon-
ents could not claim would bring peace. He further con-
tended that the only constructive note in the entire
White Pa oer was the "...apparent fact that our policy-
makers' have at long last realized that the communist con-
spiracy is worldwide and that its penetration into China
5>The China 'Whit e Paper
, Introduction.
•5^The Now York Times, August 6, 1949.
The Hew York Times , August 8, 1949 8
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Is a' threat to all of China's neighbors.""
In the House of Representatives, Walter Judd
charged sixteen instances of omission, falsification or
distortion. Secretary Acheson answered the allegations,
point by point, and reiterated the content of the White
Paper .
It is insinuated that documents were de-
liberately omitted in order to falsify
the record. These insinuations are not
supported by any evidence. They could
not be supported because there is not
one iota of truth in them.... I plain-
ly stated that this volume (White Paper)
is not 'the full historical record 1 of
the period covered. I repeat that it
is a fair and honest record. ^o
The Nationalist circles both here and abroad, re-
actions to the White Pacer were, on the whole, surprising-
ly mild. When press reports first indicated late in July
that the document was about to be published, the
Chinese Nationalist Ambassador, V.K'. Wellington Koo , vjas
reported to have made "representations" to the State De-
partment— "that such publication. . .could only aid the
cause of the Chinese Communist forces and depress the
morale of the people in free China. "^ Later, Ambassador
Loo admitted that his government might have been guilty
of "acts of commission and omission" in the past.
^Department of State Bulletin
, Vol. 21, No. 531,
September" 5. 19^9, pp. 350-352, 359. The "sixteen in-
stances" are contained herein.
^3*12,
_
Ne *-T York Times, August 5, 19^9
«
°°The New York Times , August 8, 194-9.
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General Chen Zheng, the governor of Taiwan was quoted as
saying,
The '.rhite Paper has awakened us. "./~ must
now start on the road of self"- help.
Hence publication of the White Paper ulll
do us no ham./--.
Not all Nationalist reaction was nlld, however,
Dr. Fu Szunien the President of Taiwan University and
long a leader of China's anti-coimunist intellectuals
felt that all parties concerned were responsible for the
plight of the free Chinese , --''however , the U.S. Govern-
ment which had caused our government to come to such a
pass... won't assume any responsibility and cannot justify
62itself by publication of a paper black or white."
The first official view of the Chinese Nationalists
appeared in the New York limes on ^ugust 17 . In it, the
Nationalists noted, with satisfaction, that two common
views were shared. These were that the— "Chinese Commun-
ists are thorough Nar:«ists and tools of Moscow" and
that— "the Soviet Union has violated, both in letter and
in spirit, the treaty of friendship and alliance between
China and the Soviet Union, concluded in 19^5 • " However,
the Nationalists were not enthusiastic over the contents








At the same time, the Chinese government
declares that it takes serious exception
to the views and statements on many other
important questions contained in the 'Jhite
Paper. s^
The Nationalists did not say with vrhich views and state-
ments they took exception because it would be "to the de-
triment of the traditional friendship between the Chinese
and American people," but that at some later date would
state— "more fully— its position and relevant facts with
regard to various complex subjects dealt with... for the
information of the Chinese and American public so as to
further the mutual understanding and cordial relations
between the two peoples." ^ It appears that the Chinese
Nationalists did not want to create any further undesire-
able publicity which might arouse the American public
against their cause.
As it was shown previously, the opinion of the
general public during early 19^9 was in favor of Chiang
and the Nationalists but by the end of the year, massive
aid to the Nationalist received unfavorable reception.
The majority of the attentive public— those who maintain
an interest in the affairs of government ~>—appeared to
°3




^5James N. Hosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign
Policy
,
(New York, Random House, I96I ) , The author dif-
ferentiates between the mass public and attentive public-
the former consisting of 75-90 percent of the population
and the latter composing the remainder of the population
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have become disenchanted with the situation in China much
earlier and the publication of the ^."hite Paper only en-
forced their opinion that further support of Chiang was
hopeless. In May, 19^9 » those who had an opinion favored
a "hands off, do nothing" or a "lost cause now" policy
by a ratio of two to one against those who thought that
some aid should be furnished.
In September, 19^9* another poll of the public who
had heard or read anything about the Wh 1 1 e Paper indicat-
ed that only one percent of that group thought we should
—
(AIPC of i:ay 27, 19^9, Education group)
What "do you, yourself Leave alone,
think the U.S. should hands off,












Public Opinion quarterly, Vol. XIII, Fall, 19*1-9, p. 5^3.
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6qhelp China. 7 There appear to be some incongruities in
the poll since a larger percentage favored help to Chiang
Kai Shek than to China, possibly indicating a minority
favoring the Nationalists on Formosa rather than on the
China mainland.
The Legal Status of Formosa
Prior to 19^9 » the allied Powers and the members
of the United Nations appeared to be in agreement in re-
spect to the status—and future status— of the island of
^(AIPO of September 18, 19^9, of 36 percent who
heard or read anything about the U.S. government's re-
cent report ^White Paper;/ on China.)
What is your opinion of the way the govern-






U.S.. did best it could 26^
U.S. should help China 1
U.S. should stay out of Chl-na 2
Don't know 18




Do you think the U.S. should or should











It appears that the Cairo Declaration of 19^2 was
an unimportant piece of the foundation for Allied policy
toward Formosa. The Declaration, resulting from the first
Cairo Conference in November, 19^3 t read in part:
It is their /the United States, China,
and Great Britain/ purpose that Japan
be stripped of all the islands in the
Pacific which she has seized or occu-
pied since the beginning of the First
World War in 191^ and has stolen from
the Chinese, such as. . .Formosa ..
.





Russia was not at war with Japan at the time of the Cairo
Conference, and as a result, was not a signatory to the
declaration. However, at the Teheran Conference, Stalin
replied that, "although he could make no commitments he
thoroughly approved. . .all its ^the Declaration/ contents. 11 '
At the Potsdam Conference, efforts to obtain Rus-
sia's formal agreement to the Cairo Declaration failed
because,, in justification, Stalin claimed that Russia was
still at peace with Japan. This was one of the reasons
that Russia did not become a signatory to the Potsdam De-
claration. Paragraph (8) of the Proclamation, issued on
July 26, 19^5, specified that: ".The terms of the Cairo
?°United States Department of State, "The Conference
at Cairo and Teheran, Foreign Relations of the United




72Declaration shall be carried out." When the Allied
victory over Japan became immencnt, Russia declared war
on that nation, and in a statement handed to the Japanese
Ambassador, Soviet Foreign Minister i'iolotov declared:
Taking into the consideration the refu-
sal of Japan to surrender, the Allies
approached the Soviet Government with a
proposal to join the wax against Japan-
ese aggression.... Faithful to its ob-
ligations to its allies, the Soviet
Government accepted the proposal of the
Allies and adhere to the statement of
the Allied rowers of July 26, 19^5
/Potsdam Proclamation/.... As of 9
August, the Soviet Union will consider
it is in a state of war with Japan.no
Thus, the Soviet Union finally agreed to adhere to the
terms of the Cairo Declaration.
The Instrument of Surrender of the Japanese Em-
pire, signed and accepted by Japan and the Allied Powers,
reiterated the provisions of the Cairo Declaration and
the Potsdam Proclamation. Its provisions stated in
part:
The Japanese Government and. the Japan-
ese Imperial General Headquarters,
hereby accept the provisions set forth
in the declaration issued by the heads
of Government of the United States,
72United States Department of State, "The Con-
ference of Berlin (Potsdam)," Foreign Relations of the






China, and Great Britain on July 26,
19^5, at Potsdam.^
Even today, there appears to be a question as to
the international legal status of Formosa. Frank P.
Morello, in his book, The International Legal Status of
Formosa , covers the subject briefly but well. While it
is felt in some circles that the claims of Red China may
be valid under certain circumstances, Mr. Horello probab-
ly struck the crux of the situation when he stated:
Except for the claims of Red China,
whose own status is questionable, it can
be said that the occupation of Formosa
by the Nationalist Government has been
undisturbed. In addition, this de facto
exercise of governmental authority has
been continuous for nineteen years. The
possession of Formosa by the Nationalist
Government has been maintained by an as-
sertion of right. It follows that if
the principle of prescription, as inter-
preted, and applied within the framework
of international lav;, it is to be ac-
cepted in the case of China, then there
can be no lawyer* s doubts as to the
legitimacy of Nationalist China's title
to Formosa. «<
To use a layman* s terms, possession is nine-tenths of
the law, and the Nationalists had possession, whether
the Communists, the Formosans, or the rest of the world
liked it or not.
75Frank P. Morello, The international Legal Status
of Formosa
,




The Claims of the Formosans
The Formosans, or Taiwanese, wanted a complete
separation from "both Chinas. They neither wanted to be
conquered by the communists nor did they desire to be
dominated by the Nationalists. Their views were based
on two assumptions--
1) They claimed that the Cairo Declara-
tion is not valid because it violat-
ed the terms of the Atlantic Charter,
specifically that they did not have
the right to self determination.
2) The predominantly Chinese ethnic
origin of the populus did not neces-
sarily make them Chinese. Their
argument was based basically on the
fact that they had been ruled by the
Japanese since May 8, 1895* There-
fore the Chinese had no claim on
them. Long political separation and,
finally, misrule by the Chinese
after 19^5 ha<i given the Formosans
right to independence.
Probably, the strongest argument against Nationalist
Chinese domination was in the form of Government or rule
that they brought to the island. As one writer stated:
. . .a second look around Formosa turns
up plenty of evidence of the same kind
of mismanagement, political corruption,
military rivalries and lack of unity
that brought defeat to the Nationalists
on the Mainland. ...the peoples' hatred
of Mainland Chinese is evident every-
where on the island. ...They /The For-
mosans/ respect order and efficiency;
they want self government . o£
U» s « News and >--'qrld Reoort, "Why the U.S. Isn't




The Formosans, despite the fact th.it they were exploited
by the Japanese for fifty years, felt that reverting to
Chinese rule in any form was bad. They were quite dis-
illusioned and as one Formosan replied to an American
officer, "i'ou only dropped the atom bomb on the Japanese;
you have dropped the Chinese army on us. M ' ' The article
went on to say that "General Chen Yi , appointed as the
first governor of liberated Formosa and his officers,
regarded Formosa as a rich spoil of war which was to
compensate this fortunate company for all the losses and
on
hardships of the war years." It appears that the
people who were writing about China during this period
were definitely not in favor of Chiang. George H. Kerr
wrote:
Chiang beleaguered on Formosa is even
less useful as an ally than he was on
the Mainland under the most favorable
conditions. To continue either Mili-
tary or economic aid now would only
serve his personal ambitions briefly
for his military and legal position is
untenable. oq
Mr. Kerr was much uhkinder to Chiang in his work Formosa
80




, "The Chinese in Formosa," an edi-
torial, Vol. 15?, July 23, 19^9, p. 196.
78Ibid
79poreiftn Policy Bulletin , "What the United States
Should do in Formosa," Vol. 29, No. 11, December 23, 19^9
o






the period toward which this paper Is pointed,,
"
The January 5, 1950 Decision
By the first part of the year of 1950. It became
clear that a decision concerning Formosa would "be manda-
tory. As Roger Eilsman put It:
There were members of Congress as in all
areas of American life including the Ex-
ecutive, who saw that China was being
lost to the West and that a radically new
policy was necessary
.g-.
The President was clearly aware that a bold program of
intervention and support of the Nationalists would not be
accepted by Congress or the American public. Therefore,
on January 5» 1950 » "the President in a special message,
declared:
The United States has no predatory de-
signs on Formosa or on any other Chinese
territory. The United States has no de-
sire to obtain special rights or privi-
leges or to establish military bases on
Formosa at this time . Nor does it have
any intention of utilizing its armed
forces to interfere- in the present situa-
tion. The United States will not pursue
a course which will lead to involvement
in the civil conflict in China. Similar-
ly, the United States Government will not
provide military aid or advice to Chinese
forces on Formosa. In the view of the
United States Government, the resources
on Formosa are adequate to enable them
AoN. Scott and R.H. Dawson, Readings in the leak-
ing o_f American Foreign Policy , "Congressional and Execu-
tive Relations and the Foreign Policy Consensus" by
Roger Hilsman, (New York: Macmillan, 1965)1 p. I89.
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to obtain the items which they might con-
sider for the defense of the Island. The
United States Government proposes to con-
tinue under existing legislative authority •
the present ECA program of economic assist-
ence.go
Shortly after the message was delivered, Secretary
of State Acheson held a conference to explain why the
phrase "at this time" was used in an otherwise firm de-
claration of policy. He pointed out that in case Ameri-
can Forces might be attacked in the Far East, the United
States "must be completely free to take whatever action
o «a
in whatever area is necessary for its own security."
He furthermore, in his press conference, revealed that
the decisive reasons for the President's declaration were
not strategic. "The underlying factors. . .are not in
that area. They have to do with the fundamental inte-
grity of the United States and with maintaining in the
world the belief that when the United States takes a
position it sticks to that position and does not change
it by reason of transitory expediency or advantage on
its part."8^
O p
Department of State Bulletin , January 16, 1950,
p, 79. "Italics mine"
83
Department of State Bulletin, January,. 16, 1950,
p. 80.
84
The New York Times , January 6, 1950.
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The interesting part of Secretary ncheson's
theory toward the Far Bast is that he left the door com-
pletely open to develop another policy if necessary. In
a speech before the National Press Club of Washington,
DoCo on January 12— seven days after the Presidents
declaration on Formosa—nothing was mentioned about For-
mosa, while almost every other country or problem area
in the Western Pacific Basin or the Far East was men-
tioned, specifically, the Aluetians, Hyukus, Japan, Korea,
Philippine, Australia, Nalaya, Indonesia, China, India
Or
and Pakistan. He furthermore warned that Russia would
try to take over the northern provinces of China and con-
tinue to try to influence the Communist Chinese. There
appeared to be a faint hope that mainland China could be
worlds away from Soviet influence. He said that:
what does that /Soviet take-over of the
Northern provinces, Cuter Ilongolia, Man-
churia and Soviet influence in China/
mean for us. It means that nothing that
we do and nothing that we say must ob-
scure the reality of the fact. ^11 the
efforts of propaganda will not be able
to obscure it„ The only thing that cen
obscure it is the folly of ill-conceived
adventures on our part which easily could
do so and I urge all who are thinking about
such. foolish adventures to remember that we
must not seize the uneviable position X'/hlch
the Russians have carved out for them-
selves. We must not undertake to deflect
from the Russians to ourselves the right-
eous anger, and the wrath, snd' the hatred
of the Chinese people which must develop.
...We must take the position we have al-
°
-




ways taken—that anyone uho violates the
integrity of China is the encuy of China
and is acting contrary to oar oi.n Interest.
. , ./ire must/ keep our purposes perfectly
straight, perfectly pure, and perfectly
above board and do net set them mixed up
with legal quibbles or the attempt to do
one thing and really achieve the other.g^
This was not really contrary to previous United States
policy toward China but it did serve notice to Communist
China about thoughts of Soviet imperialism.
As to the concern of the security of the United
States, he defined the defensive perimeter which:
runs along to the Aleutians to Japan and
then goes to the Ryukyus...to the Philip-
pine Islands o... So far as the military
security of other areas in the Pacific is
concerned, it must be clear that no per-
son can guarantee these areas against
attack. But it also must be clear that
such a guarantee is hardly sensible or
necessary within the realm of practical
relationship. go
He struck the key to the United States Government
attitude in a later portion of the speech, in stating
that:
Should an attack occur. .. the initial re-
liance must be on the people attacked to
resist it and then upon the commitments
of the entire civilized world under the
Charter of the United Nations which so far
has proved a weak reed to lean on by any
people who are determined to protect their
pp. 111-118
86Ibld., p. 115.
8 ^Department of State Bulletin , January 23, 1950,
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independence against outside aggression. gg
As to the expected criticism that the decision
would certainly arouse, primarily from Congress, Secretary
Acheson felt that:
It would have been desireable from our
point of view if the whole question of
the Far East... and of Formosa. . .could have
been discussed fully with members of both
parties on the Hill before any statement
was made. But one has to choose in this
life, and it was more important to clari-
fy thinking than it was to go on and have
the most desireable of all possible things
which is consultation. gn
In spite of immediate criticism which was to fol-
low, it did not have much effect on Secretary acheson 1 s
views on the policy. In an address before the Common-
wealth Club of California at San Francisco on March 15.
1950» he covered the same points he reiterated the same
points that he had made in his speech before the National
90
Press Club two months earlier. Again, in this speech,
he mentioned practically every area of concern in Asia
except Formosa.
Some observers had the impression that the Secre-
tary of State practically told the Communists that the
88Ibid
., pp. 111-118. "Italics mine"
^Department of State Bulletin , January 16, 1950,
"United States Policy Towards Formosa," extemporaneous re-
marks by Secretary Acheson released on January 5» 1950.
9°Department of State Bulletin , March 27, 1950.
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United States x-zould not defend South Korea and Formosa
against Asian Communist Invasion. Among these were Sena-
tor Robert Taft and Dwight Eisenhower, Other critics
were former President Hoover and Senators Smith and Van-
denburg. They, however, failed to rally support. Harold
L. Ickes wrote:
President Truman was more than right when
he set American warmongers back on their
heels by making it known that there would
be no fishing by the United States in the
turgid waters of Formosa. He must have
seen the course proposed by the bumbling
former President Hoover, with the support
of the usually level-headed and high minded
statesman, Senator Robert A. Taft, would be
taking a step in the direction of a third
devastating world war. Mr, Hoover's genu-
flections in the direction of the God of
War, surprising as they are, are not so
disturbing as the position of such men as
Senator Taft... and Senator Smith.... The
equivical position of Senator Vandenburg
is also cause for concern. g.
The informed American public during this period
was not unanimous in the decision to not do anything in
the case of Formosa. In a poll completed on February 3§
1950, a slightly higher percentage indicated that some
form of aid should be provided rather than take a "watch
-j-j^g New Republican , "Truman's Formosan Policy,"





While there were no immediate official announce-
ments by the Chinese Nationalists concerning President
Truman* s January 5 Declaration, George H. Kerr wrote:
The Nationalists called President Tru-
man's declaration a 'betrayal* , and basic
Chinese anti-foreign sentiment came well-
ing to the surface. There was bitter
talk in Taipei and on January 9» hot
headed young officers aboard the Nation-
alist gunboat WULING shelled an American
freighter as it moved toward Shanghai. go
That certain factions of the Nationalists would be openly
hostile to the Declaration is understandable. However,
9 2AIF0, February 3, 1950
Of 60 percent of a sample who had heard or read
about Formosa recently only k9 percent appeared
well informed on the subject and was asked
further: The united States could take any of
the following three steps concerning the island
of Formosa. Which of the steps do you thing
the government should take?
(1) Use United States Armed Forces
to protect and hold Formosa? 10/£
(2) Give financial aid and war
materials to General Chiang
Kai Shek to help the army
hold the island? \h%
(3) Do nothing now and wait to
see what happens? Z\%
Informed on the subject but
no opinions as to what
should be done? h%
Publi c Opinion Quarterly , Summer, 1950, Vol. XIV,
93George H. Kerr, Formosa Betrayed
,
(Cambridge,




It i's felt that the Nationalists, in general, foresaw
the future course of United States policy toward Formosa
after the publication of the White Paper or even before
that, and again*, would not take any action to arouse
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